



New Haven, CT 06520-8269
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/
CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 902
Risk, Network Quality, and Family Structure:
Child Fostering Decisions in Burkina Faso
Richard Akresh
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
January 2005
Notes: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions and
critical comments.
I am grateful to Michael Boozer, Paul Schultz, and Christopher Udry for extensive support
and suggestions during the project design, fieldwork, and analysis stages. I also thank
Jennifer Hunt, Ilana Redstone, Tavneet Suri, and Harsha Thirumurthy for reading multiple
drafts of this paper, and seminar participants at the BREAD and NEUDC conferences and
at several universities for helpful comments. I acknowledge the collaboration between Yale
University and l'Unité d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Démographie of the University
of Ouagadougou that aided the data collection.  I thank the following organizations for
financial support: National Science Foundation (Grant No. 0082840), Social Science
Research Council, J. William Fulbright Fellowship, National Security Education Program,
Institute for the Study of World Politics, and Yale Center for International and Area Studies.
Finally, I thank the members of the field research team, in particular the supervisors,
Ouedraogo Touende Bertrand and Hubert Barka Traore. Contact Information: University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Economics, 504 E. Armory Avenue,
Champaign, IL 61820. Email: akresh@uiuc.edu.
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract=643163
An index to papers in the Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper Series is located at:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/research.htmRisk, Network Quality, and Family Structure: 
Child Fostering Decisions in Burkina Faso
Richard Akresh
Abstract
Researchers often assume household structure is exogenous, but child fostering, the institution in
which parents send their biological children to live with another family, is widespread in sub-
Saharan Africa and provides evidence against this assumption. Using data I collected in Burkina
Faso, I analyze a household's decision to adjust its size and composition through fostering. A
household fosters children as a risk-coping mechanism in response to exogenous income shocks, if
it has a good social network, and to satisfy labor demands within the household. Increases of one
standard deviation in a household's agricultural shock, percentage of good network members, or
number of older girls increase the probability of sending a child above the current fostering level by
29.1, 30.0, and 34.5 percent, respectively. Testing whether factors influencing the sending decision
have an opposite impact on the receiving decision leads to a rejection of the symmetric, theoretical
model for child fostering.
Keywords:  Child Fostering, Risk-coping, Social Networks, Household Structure 
JEL Codes:  O15, J12, D101 Introduction
Theoretical and empirical research on household decision-making often treats the household￿ s com-
position as exogenous. However, if families adjust their structure (by changing who is a resident
member) in response to factors a⁄ecting the household, then this assumption is not valid and
subsequent conclusions might be misleading. In sub-Saharan Africa, the institution of child fos-
tering, in which parents send their biological children to live with another family, is widespread.
Household survey data collected by the author in rural Burkina Faso show that approximately
twenty-seven percent of households either sent or received a foster child between 1998 and 2000,
and these children spent, on average, 2.75 years living away from their parents.1
This paper examines why families adjust their structure by sending and receiving children, and
provides evidence that the assumption of a ￿xed and unchanging household is not reasonable in the
African context. The paper can consider motivations for fostering that previous researchers have
not been able to explore because the ￿eldwork involved a research methodology in which I located
and interviewed the sending and receiving households participating in each fostering exchange.
I present a theoretical framework and empirical evidence that three principal factors in￿ uence
the household decision to foster a child. First, households use child fostering as a risk-coping
mechanism in response to exogenous income shocks. Households that experience worse shocks are
more likely to send a child to live with another family. Previous researchers have documented that,
in risky environments, households may use various methods to cope with exogenous shocks such
as adult migration and marriage strategies (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Paulson, 2000), livestock
sales (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993), informal credit markets (Udry, 1994), increased labor supply
(Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas, 2003), and gifts and transfers from relatives and neighbors
1Additional Demographic and Health survey evidence from 16 African countries shows that many families adjust
their household size through fostering in addition to natural fertility (Vandermeersch, 1997). The percentage of
households with foster children ranges from 15 percent in Ghana to 37 percent in Namibia.
1(Goldstein, 2000; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003).2 One researcher developed a theoretical model
showing that risk might motivate households to foster children but was unable to empirically test
it (Serra, 1996).3 None of the existing economics research has been able to test whether households
use child fostering as a risk-coping strategy. This is the ￿rst paper to provide evidence that fostering
is used to deal with adverse shocks and income ￿ uctuations.
Second, households with better opportunities, measured in terms of the quality of their social
network, are more likely to foster. Previous research has considered the role social networks play
in outcomes such as workers locating jobs (Granovetter, 1973; Montgomery, 1991; Munshi, 2003)
and the decision to migrate (Espinosa and Massey, 1997), but the importance of networks for child
fostering has never been explored or quantitatively measured.
Third, in most African households, children perform chores that might include cooking, cleaning,
childcare, fetching wood, and running errands. Having too many or too few children in a given
gender and age class may not optimize household production, and therefore, parents are more
likely to foster children to o⁄set demographic imbalances. These child labor results are consistent
with the seminal work on child fostering by Ainsworth (1990, 1996) as well as the research by
anthropologists, demographers, and sociologists working in West Africa (Schildkrout, 1973; Goody,
1982; Oppong and Bleek, 1982; Isiugo-Abanihe, 1985; Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe, 1989).4
The survey data provide empirical evidence that a household is signi￿cantly more likely to send
2Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003) examine changes in household size and composition as one of several
mechanisms that households might have utilized in response to the 1997 ￿nancial crisis in Indonesia. Their considera-
tion of the household response to an aggregate, macroeconomic shock di⁄ers from the current analysis, which focuses
exclusively on the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on child fostering.
3Sociologists and demographers have also provided evidence that households use fostering to deal with uncertainty
and risk (Brydon, 1979; Etienne, 1979; Goody, 1982; Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe, 1989).
4Several sociologists and demographers have provided evidence that households foster children for educational
investment when local opportunities are limited (Goody, 1982; Chernichovsky, 1985; Gould, 1985; Isiugo-Abanihe,
1985), but Ainsworth could not empirically con￿rm this and I do not ￿nd evidence that it is a signi￿cant motivating
factor for the households in Burkina Faso. In the survey, households cited the reason each child was fostered, and only
nine percent listed schooling. Given that respondents perceive schooling as a positive reason for fostering (compared
to child labor), nine percent is likely to be an upper bound for the number of children actually fostered for schooling.
2out a child if it experiences a negative shock, has a better quality social network, or has additional
children in a given age and gender class. However, none of these factors explain a household￿ s
receiving decision. The only factor that is signi￿cantly relevant for the receiving decision is the
receiving household￿ s wealth, with richer households more likely to receive a child. One implication
of the theoretical framework is that factors in￿ uencing the sending decision should have an opposite
e⁄ect on the receiving decision. Based on the empirical evidence, I reject this symmetric, theoretical
model for child fostering.5
The importance of understanding why households foster children is magni￿ed by the fact that
most international development organizations and many academic researchers believe fostering has
negative consequences for that child￿ s human capital investment and welfare outcomes (Bledsoe
and Brandon, 1989; Haddad and Hoddinott, 1994; UNICEF, 1999; Case, Lin, McLanahan, 2000;
Kielland and Sanogo, 2002; Bishai et al., 2003; Fafchamps and Wahba, 2004). However, related
research using these data shows that foster children experience increased school enrollment after
moving away from their biological parents, indicating fostering may help insulate poor households
from adverse shocks (Akresh, 2004). In circumstances when parents may not be able to adequately
provide for their children (due to a negative income shock), but the family has a high quality social
network, the biological siblings remaining behind are also protected from the shock￿ s consequences
as more resources are made available for them subsequent to the fostering.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical setting for
the data collection. In Section 3, I describe the theoretical framework that motivates the household
fostering decision. Section 4 presents the empirical results for the household sending and receiving
decision and tests the symmetry implication of the theoretical model. Section 5 concludes.
5Empirical evidence indicates that households that receive children have access to better quality networks compared
to households that neither send nor receive. This contradicts the theoretical framework, which implies that sending
households should have a better network quality than non-fostering households and non-fostering households should
have a better network quality than the receiving households.
32 Empirical Setting
The data were collected in Bazega province in central Burkina Faso, located approximately ￿fty
miles from the capital, Ouagadougou.6 Households in this region consist predominantly of subsis-
tence farmers growing millet, sorghum, and groundnuts and have an average annual income of $183
(based on an average foreign exchange rate from 1998 to 2000 of $1 = 641 FCFA). On average,
these households have 10.6 members consisting of a household head, 1.5 wives, 3.6 children under
age 18, 3.2 children over age 18, and 1.3 members that might include the household head￿ s mother,
brothers, sisters, grandchildren, distant relatives, and individuals with no direct relationship. Table
1 contains additional summary statistics for the data.
The ￿eldwork component of the project improved on previous studies in several ways. First, I
adopted a methodology that involved locating and interviewing the sending and receiving house-
holds of each fostering exchange. For example, if a household interviewed in the initial sample
had sent a child to another family, then the receiving household was found and interviewed in the
tracking phase of the survey. Similarly, if a household interviewed in the initial sample had received
a child, then the biological parents of the child (sending household) were located and interviewed.
This is the ￿rst time that both the sending and receiving household from a given fostering ex-
change have been tracked and interviewed, and it enables a better understanding of the reasons
why a household fosters its children, as well as the welfare implications of that decision.
Second, I collected detailed information, such as occupation, marital status, education, and
demographic characteristics, about the households in the respondent￿ s social network. This infor-
mation allows me to construct quantitative measures of the network￿ s quality and the impact of that
quality on the fostering decision, which prior to this data collection would not have been possible.
6More detailed information about the ￿eldwork, including the survey instruments, ￿eld enumerator training man-
uals, and project reports can be found on the website: https://net￿les.uiuc.edu/akresh/www.
4I limited the social network to only include immediate family members (parents, brothers, sisters,
and adult children) that are not co-resident, instead of all potential households that could send or
receive children. This restriction has the bene￿t that I reduce any potential endogeneity problems
related to the fact that a household￿ s decision to foster might be correlated with its choice of which
households are in its network. With this de￿nition of network members, the sending household
takes its network￿ s size and quality as exogenously given.7 Third, I asked retrospective questions
about agricultural production and agricultural shocks for every crop the household grew during the
three years prior to the survey interview in order to understand how a household reacts to changes
in its economic environment.
The survey consisted of two distinct phases. The initial phase entailed interviews with 606
household heads and their 812 wives in ￿fteen randomly selected villages in Bazega province. In
these villages, the unit of analysis for the sampling frame was the compound, with some compounds
containing multiple households.8 Within each compound, an enumerator individually interviewed
the head of every household and then separately interviewed all of his wives, if applicable.9
The tracking phase of the survey consisted of ￿nding the 316 paired households that had ex-
changed a foster child and interviewing the head of each household along with all of his wives
using the same survey instrument as the initial phase. I restricted the tracking to those households
7In addition, during the pre-testing of the survey instrument, respondents were unable to consistently answer
detailed questions about network members￿characteristics if the questions pertained to individuals other than imme-
diate family members. Little information is lost by restricting the network space since sixty-two percent of all foster
children in the sample were sent to or received from immediate family members.
8To increase the number of households in the sample that had fostered children, I adopted a two part sampling
frame that included a random sample and a choice-based sample both drawn from a village level census that included
information about the fostering status of every household (for more details, see Akresh, 2004b). The choice-based
sample consisted of compounds that had fostered a child between 1998 and 2000. All results in this paper use the
entire sample, but results are qualitatively similar when I restrict the observations to just the random sample. Using
the population fostering weights from the village level census to adjust the choice-based sample does not signi￿cantly
alter the results. A total of 383 compounds containing 606 households were selected with approximately sixty percent
of the compounds in the random sample.
9The household de￿nition (described in Akresh, 2004b) that assigned every individual living in the compound to
a speci￿c household was implemented to ensure that individuals in the compound who might have been involved in
making a fostering decision would be interviewed.
5that had exchanged a foster child between 1998 and 2000 and where the child￿ s age at the time of
fostering was between ￿ve and ￿fteen inclusive.
For two reasons, I did not track children under ￿ve. First, researchers studying child fostering
in Africa have argued that young children are fostered for di⁄erent reasons than older children
(Vandermeersch, 2002). In particular, young children are primarily consumers, but around age
￿ve, children are expected to become economic contributors to the family, undertaking tasks in
the household, ￿elds, and marketplace. At this time, a household would become concerned with
o⁄setting demographic imbalances in the number of its children of a given age and gender. Second,
this survey con￿rms that fostering young children is much less common than older children, showing
a signi￿cant jump in fostering rates at age six. Between 1998 and 2000, approximately one percent
of children under ￿ve were fostered, compared to ten percent of children aged ￿ve to ￿fteen.
Children aged sixteen and older were also excluded from the tracking because, at that age,
most villagers in rural Burkina Faso would consider them adults. They are physically mature,
have passed initiation rites, and females are of an acceptable age for marriage. In addition, for
older children, it becomes di¢ cult to disentangle what is child fostering and what is an example of
household members splitting o⁄ to form distinct and separate households.
The success of the tracking phase makes these data particularly unique and appropriate for un-
derstanding why a household fosters its child. Approximately sixty percent of the paired households
were located within a twenty-￿ve mile radius of the child￿ s home, twenty-￿ve percent were located
in the capital ￿fty miles away, six percent were scattered across the other provinces of Burkina Faso
about one hundred and ￿fty miles away, and nine percent were in C￿te d￿ Ivoire approximately eight
hundred miles away. There were 316 paired households to be found during the tracking phase, and
the ￿eld research team located 94.9 percent of them, 300 households in total.10
10The sixteen tracked households that were not interviewed included four households (three in the capital and one
63 Theoretical Motivation for the Child Fostering Decision
To model the household￿ s fostering decision, I present a theoretical framework that describes the
e¢ cient allocation of children across households in a social network. The framework provides mo-
tivation for risk-coping, child labor, and network quality as three principal reasons why households
foster children. The key assumption of the model is that foster children and biological children (in
a given age and gender class) are perfect substitutes in production and utility. This assumption
implies that factors in￿ uencing the sending decision should in￿ uence the receiving decision in an
equal and opposite way. The empirical evidence rejects this implication, indicating the need for
a richer model of household decision making that incorporates altruism and treats foster children
di⁄erently than biological children.
To illustrate this framework, I examine a social network made up of N households indexed by
i where i = 1;:::;N. I let s index the S states of nature, with each state having an objective and
known probability of occurrence, ￿s. For household i, Ki is a vector representing the number of
household i￿ s resident children and measures the di⁄erent age and gender classes of these children.
The variable Fis is a vector representing the net number of foster children received in each age and
gender class for household i if state s occurs. In the model, the number of foster children is de￿ned
on the set of real numbers and is not limited to integer values.11
Consumption for household i in state s, Cis, is determined by its output in state s, Cis =
Gis (Ki + Fis). In the survey region, there are no land or labor markets and so these factors, which
in C￿te d￿ Ivoire) that were found but refused to be surveyed, four households in the capital in which the child left
the village in search of work and had not yet contacted his biological parents to indicate the family with whom he
was now living, two households where the parents left children in the village in Burkina Faso and went to work in
C￿te d￿ Ivoire but the receiving household did not have information to locate them, and three households (two in
C￿te d￿ Ivoire and one in Togo) that had contacted the parents to inform them they were moving towns and would
send new contact information once they were settled. Finally, the remaining three cases included issues of disputed
paternity, alleged adultery, and con￿rmed sorcery.
11Imposing an integer constraint on the number of foster children yields qualitatively the same results regarding
the Pareto e¢ cient allocation of children in the network, except there would be a wedge driven between optimal and
actual fostering.
7can be heterogeneous across households, are incorporated into the production function, Gis. The
production function also incorporates other characteristics of the household that in￿ uence output,
such as occupation and marital status. Capital is not considered in the model since almost no
households in the survey area use capital inputs such as animal traction. Net fostering for household
i determines its amount of available child labor, and household i￿ s production, Gis (Ki + Fis), is
increasing and concave in child labor, G
0
is () > 0, G
00
is () < 0.
For household i, I de￿ne utility, Ui, to be a function of resident children￿ s per capita consump-
tion, Cis
(Ki+Fis). The utility function is twice continuously di⁄erentiable with U0 () > 0;U00 () < 0:
The timing in the model is such that households in the social network initially pick a vector of
potential fostering decisions, the state of nature is observed, the household completes the fostering
exchange it initially committed to, and then production and consumption outcomes are realized.12
Any Pareto e¢ cient allocation of children within the social network can be characterized by
maximizing the weighted sum of expected utilities for each of the N households for some choice of
Pareto weights for each household i, ￿i, with 0 < ￿i < 1 and
PN














subject to the production constraint for each household in each state of nature and the condition
that net fostering across households in the social network is zero:
Cis = Gis(Ki + Fis) 8i;s (2)
N X
i=1
Fis = 0 8s (3)
12For this model, I assume a unitary household framework in which there is no intra-household bargaining with
respect to the fostering decision. A related paper explores this assumption.
8In this model, results are symmetric for sending and receiving households because only net fostering
enters the maximization problem and the sum of net fostering across all households in the social
network must be zero.
To illustrate the di⁄erent motivations for child fostering, I examine two extreme sub-cases of
the above model. First, I focus exclusively on the labor productivity explanation and assume there
is no fostering for risk-coping reasons. I assume there are perfect insurance markets, so households
have complete insurance. Even with perfect insurance markets, households foster children to equate
the marginal product of child labor across households in the network. Because of the symmetry
result previously mentioned, if a household with a low marginal productivity of child labor sends
a child, there must be a household with a higher marginal productivity of child labor that receives
the child. For a given production function, a family with many children of a given age and gender
will have a lower marginal productivity of child labor than a family with few children.
Second, households foster children only for risk-coping but not labor productivity reasons.
I eliminate the labor productivity motivation by making household production not depend on
child labor. There are no insurance or ￿nancial markets, but fostering can serve as an insurance
substitute. Even without productivity di⁄erentials, households in a network will try to equalize the
marginal utility of consumption across states by fostering children. If a household experiences low
consumption, it will send out a child to a household in the network experiencing high consumption.
These sub-cases highlight two factors, labor productivity and risk-coping, that in￿ uence house-
hold i￿ s fostering decision. If household i has low productivity or low consumption, it is more likely
to send a child. However, because of the symmetry result, the other households in the network also
play a role in household i￿ s decision. If household j in the network experiences transitory factors
such as high productivity or high consumption that in￿ uence its decision to receive a child, then
household i will also be more likely to send. In addition to transitory factors, if household j in
9the network has permanent characteristics such as a good occupation or a stable marital situa-
tion which in￿ uence its decision to receive a child, these characteristics will also make household
i more likely to send. These permanent and transitory characteristics of the other households in
the network constitute the network￿ s quality and measure the fostering opportunities available to
households in that network.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Household Sending Decision
To analyze the household sending decision, I need to measure each household￿ s network quality. I
begin by examining why a household selects a particular network member to receive its child. I
estimate logit and household ￿xed e⁄ects logit (conditional logit) models of the probability a given
network member is selected to receive a child as a function of the network member￿ s characteristics
and the joint characteristics about the potential match between the member and the foster child.
Results show that a network member with a good occupation, in a stable, long-term marriage, or
the parent or child of the sending household, is more likely to be selected to receive the foster child.
Using this information, I calculate two alternative network quality measures for every household
in the sample (including households that did not foster children). The ￿rst is an ad hoc, intuitive
measure that captures two dimensions of the network￿ s quality that impacts the fostering decision,
occupational status and relationship to the respondent. In the second measure, I use the estimated
coe¢ cients from the household ￿xed e⁄ects logit regression to calculate for every network member
a predicted value, Xb ￿FELogit, that the network member would be selected to receive a foster child,
if a child were sent. I measure the household￿ s network quality as the percentage of the household￿ s
network members whose predicted value of being selected lies above some threshold level.
10Finally, I estimate the household decision to send a child in a given year as a function of
household level agricultural shocks, network quality, and variables measuring the household￿ s de-
mographic characteristics. The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical framework.
Households that experience a worse agricultural shock in a given year, have a better quality net-
work of potential receivers, or have household level demographic imbalances in the age and gender
composition of their children are more likely to send out a child.13
4.1.1 Preliminary Evidence About Selection of a Network Member
For the binary logit and household ￿xed e⁄ects logit models, which analyze why a particular network
member is selected to receive a foster child, I restrict the data to only households that sent children
to immediate family members between 1998 and 2000. This restriction is necessary because I use
information about network members who potentially could have been selected to receive a foster
child but were not. Each of the 2364 observations in the restricted dataset consist of immediate
family members linked with a sending household.14 Appendix Table 1 contains summary statistics
for the variables used in the network member selection regression.15
Analyzing descriptive statistics about network members￿occupation and relationship to the
sending family provides preliminary evidence about which factors in￿ uence the selection decision.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that 31.9 percent of immediate family members who received a foster child
13In using this two-step procedure in which I ￿rst estimate the selection of a network member and then the sending
decision, I assume there is no correlation between the network member selection and the additional option of not
sending a child. Intuitively, this assumption implies that, conditional on sending, if a household selects the oldest
brother in its network to receive its child, and is then given the additional option to not send a child but still chooses
to do so, it will still select the same oldest brother. If this assumption is violated, an alternative one-step procedure in
which I jointly estimate the selection of a network member and the sending decision would be appropriate. However,
because the data do not measure shocks for each network member, a joint estimation procedure has to make additional
assumptions about these shocks. If the assumption is not violated, both the two-step and one-step procedures will
yield similar results. An additional advantage of the two-step procedure is that it provides a summary measure of
network quality for each household that I use in other related work.
14I include in the restricted dataset all sending households identi￿ed in the initial phase, and the sending households
from the tracking phase, which were identi￿ed via their link with initial phase receivers.
15Data for immediate family members include information on the respondent￿ s mother and father. To prevent
double counting households, I omit the mother￿ s observation if the father is alive and the parents are co-resident.
11were parents of the respondent, but parents represented only 8.6 of the immediate family members
who did not receive a foster child. The likelihood ratio test that the relationship categories are
signi￿cantly di⁄erent yields a ￿2(3) test statistic of 87.7 and a corresponding p-value of zero. Panel
B of Table 3 indicates that only 8.1 percent of immediate family members who did not receive a
foster child are business people compared to 12.5 percent of family members who did receive a foster
child. Network members who are unemployed, retired, or housewives are less likely to be selected
to receive foster children. The likelihood ratio test that the occupation categories are signi￿cantly
di⁄erent yields a ￿2(6) test statistic of 10.2 and a corresponding p-value of 0.12.
4.1.2 Logit speci￿cation for estimating network member selection
I ￿rst estimate network member selection using the binary logit model, Prob(Selectedcm = 1jXcm) =
exp(Xcm￿)
[1+exp(Xcm￿)], where Selectedcm is de￿ned as a dichotomous 0,1 variable with the value 1 indicating
network member m was selected to receive foster child c, and the explanatory variables, Xcm, for
network member m relating to foster child c, are described below. The regression estimates the
probability that an immediate family member was selected to receive a foster child as a function
of the network member￿ s characteristics and the joint characteristics of the potential match from
sending a child to that network member. In the restricted 2364-observation dataset, 6.8 percent of
network members were selected to receive a foster child. The explanatory variables, Xcm, include
the network member￿ s occupation, relationship to the sending family, marital status, educational
attainment, household demographic characteristics (measuring the age and gender structure for
the network member￿ s children), whether the network member has children currently enrolled in
school, whether the network member￿ s household had a birth between 1998 and 2000, and the age
and gender characteristics of the foster child.
Logit regression results in column 1 of Table 3 provide evidence that the sending family is
12attempting to ￿nd the best receiving household for its child. A network member with a good
occupation, such as a business person or bureaucrat, is more likely to be selected, while network
members who are unemployed or retired are less likely to receive a foster child. Calculating the
marginal change in the probability of being selected due to an incremental change in the independent
variable from its mean shows that network members are 4.5 percent more likely to be selected if
their occupation is business and 6.3 percent less likely to be selected if they are unemployed or
retired. A network member who is the respondent￿ s parent or adult child is 9.1 and 5.0 percent,
respectively, more likely to be selected to receive a foster child. A network member who is recently
married, widowed, divorced, or has never been married is less likely to be selected compared to
someone married for more than three years. Widowed or divorced network members are 5.3 percent
less likely to receive a foster child, while those who have never been married are 7.0 percent less
likely. These results indicate that the receiving household is more likely to be someone with a good
occupation, in a stable marital union, and with close blood ties to the respondent.
Educational investment is sometimes cited as a reason for sending a child and households might
be more likely to select an educated network member to receive the child because that member could
value education more and keep the foster child in school. Similarly, the sending household might
select a network member living near a primary school to ensure their own child￿ s schooling. However,
neither of the coe¢ cients for the variables measuring whether the network member attended school
or has children in school is statistically signi￿cant.
Sociologists argue that having no children, a limited number of children, or too few children
of a particular gender are situations where households might receive a child to make up for these
shortcomings (Lallemand, 1980; Jonckers, 1997). Regression results provide some evidence that the
network member￿ s demographics in￿ uence the receiving decision, with network members who have
13boys aged zero to ￿ve 2.7 percent less likely to receive a child.16 The coe¢ cients for the variables
indicating if the network member recently had an infant are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
4.1.3 Household ￿xed e⁄ects logit for estimating network member selection
It is likely there are certain unobserved factors unique to a sending household and its social network
that in￿ uence the likelihood a potential network member is selected. This unobserved household
heterogeneity might include factors about the child, besides the child￿ s age and gender that are
already controlled for, such as the child￿ s personality, whether the child is hard-working, or the
child￿ s ability to do certain tasks. I address this unobserved heterogeneity by estimating network
member selection using the following household ￿xed e⁄ects logit speci￿cation, Prob(Selectedcm =
1jXcm) =
exp(￿c+Xcm￿) P
m exp(￿c+Xcm￿), where the dependent and independent variables are as previously
de￿ned and ￿c represents the ￿xed e⁄ect for foster child c in a given household. The foster child
subscript c = 1;2;:::;n denotes the groups and the network member subscript m = 1;2;:::;Mc the
observations for the cth group. I follow Chamberlain￿ s (1980) proposed method for estimating this








The household ￿xed e⁄ects logit results are presented in column 2 of Table 3. Coe¢ cient
estimates and standard errors are similar to the logit regression results. Network members who
have a good occupation, closer blood ties with the sending household, and a long-term, stable
marital situation remain more likely to be selected to receive a foster child. Network members
who attended school are more likely to receive a foster child, but the coe¢ cient is not statistically
16I also estimated a model that included interactions of the age and gender of the child sent with the age and
gender of the children in the network member￿ s family, but the results were inconclusive.
14signi￿cant. Coe¢ cient estimates for the variables measuring the network member￿ s demographics
and if the network member had an infant between 1998 and 2000 are similar in both speci￿cations.
To test which speci￿cation better ￿ts the data and whether there is unobserved heterogeneity
in the model, I calculate a likelihood ratio test statistic, 2(LFELogit ￿ LLogit), where LFELogit is
the log likelihood for the ￿xed e⁄ects logit model and LLogit is the log likelihood for the logit
speci￿cation.17 The test statistic equals 303.12 and is distributed ￿2(26) with a critical value at
the ￿ve percent level of 38.89. I can reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity, indicating the ￿xed
e⁄ects logit is the preferred speci￿cation, which I use in the following network quality analysis.
4.1.4 Measuring network quality
Using the characteristics that in￿ uence the selection of which network member receives a foster
child, I calculate two alternative network quality measures for every household in the sample. The
￿rst measure is based on the cross tabulations in Table 2, and it attempts to capture two dimensions
of the network, occupation and relationship to the respondent, which impact the receiving decision.
Households with network members who are business people and members who are either parents
or adult children would be considered to have a good network. The intuition is that households
whose network members satisfy these criteria (business person for occupation and parent or adult
child for relationship) have more opportunities available for ￿nding a favorable receiving household.
Table 4 shows that ￿fty-four percent of households have a good network measured this way. While
this network quality measure is intuitive and draws on the cross tabulations presented earlier, it
ignores other dimensions about the network￿ s quality, particularly the other variables in the network
member selection regression in Table 3.
17Under the null hypothesis of homogeneity, the ￿xed e⁄ects logit and the unconditional logit are consistent, but
the ￿xed e⁄ects logit is ine¢ cient. Under the alternative hypothesis of unobserved heterogeneity, the unconditional
logit is inconsistent, but the ￿xed e⁄ects logit is consistent and e¢ cient.
15The second network quality measure incorporates these other dimensions by using the estimated
coe¢ cients from the household ￿xed e⁄ects logit regression. For every household in the sample, I
link each child aged ￿ve to ￿fteen with that household￿ s network members to calculate the predicted
value that the network member would be selected to receive a foster child, if a child were sent.
The predicted value is based on that member￿ s characteristics and the joint characteristics of the
potential match between the member and the foster child. Since this is an out-of-sample prediction,
in most cases the child was never sent to a network member, but the predicted value estimates the
likelihood the network member would have been selected if a child had been sent.18
Using these predicted values, the second network quality measure is calculated as the percentage
of the household￿ s network members whose predicted value of being selected to receive a foster child
lies above the 80th percentile for the entire sample. I use this percentile because, in the household
￿xed e⁄ects logit described above, the average percentile for the selected network members is the
seventy-ninth percentile.19 This second measure is based on the idea that, for a fostering exchange
to occur, the sending family only needs one household to receive the child, and the measure is
intended to describe the right tail of the distribution of predicted values. Intuitively, a sending
family that has a larger share of network members with high predicted values is more likely to ￿nd
a household in its network that can receive a child.
Several intermediate steps were needed to calculate this measure. For sending households with
multiple children, each network member will have a predicted value related to every potential foster
child. For a given network member, it is possible that the predicted values related to some children
are above the 80th percentile while others are below. Network members with a predicted value
18The second network quality measure uses the estimated coe¢ cients from a regression that only includes those
households that sent a child, and is based on the assumption that any unobservables, such as shocks, that might
in￿ uence whether a household sent a child are uncorrelated with the observables that are used to calculate the
predicted probabilities.
19Results are qualitatively similar and robust when using other percentiles as the threshold level, including the
70th, 75th, and 85th percentiles.
16above the threshold for any child in the sending household are considered good.20 On average,
households have thirteen network members, and 22.8 percent of them are good quality.
Table 5 presents evidence that households with a high quality network are more likely to send a
child compared to households with a low quality network. Households with a network in which the
percentage of good members is above the median value of twenty percent constitute 65.0 percent of
households that sent a child, but only 43.4 percent of households that did not send a child. Testing
whether these are statistically di⁄erent yields a likelihood ratio ￿2(1) test statistic of 6.7 with a
corresponding p-value equal to 0.01.
4.1.5 Estimating the Probability of Sending a Child in a Given Year
I estimate the household sending decision using the binary logit model, Prob(Sendingivt = 1jXivt) =
exp(Xivt￿)
[1+exp(Xivt￿)], where Sendingivt is a 0,1 dichotomous variable taking a value of one if household i in
village v sent a child aged ￿ve to ￿fteen (inclusive) during year t and zero otherwise, and Xivt are
the variables, based on the theoretical framework, measuring agricultural shocks, network quality,
and household demographics for household i in village v at time t.21 For the household sending
regression, the sample consists of 358 households.22
The agricultural shock measure builds on hypotheses discussed in the sociological, demographic
and economic literature that economic crises a⁄ect the household￿ s decision to send a child (Serra,
20I obtain similar results using an alternative intermediate step in which a network member is considered good for
a given child and this measure is averaged across children. For example, a network member with a predicted value
above the 80th percentile for one of four children in the household would be assigned a value of 0.25. Likewise, a
network member who was a good match for all four children would be assigned a value of one.
21I also estimate the household sending decision with an ordered logit model (where the dependent variable is
the number of children sent by the household in a given year) to exploit the additional information present for
those households that sent multiple children. The coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors are similar in both
speci￿cations because 88.8 percent of the household-year observations have no child sent, 9.5 percent of the household-
year observations sent one child, and only 1.7 percent sent two children in a given year.
22The di⁄erence between the 358-observation regression sample and the 606 surveyed households consists of 63
households that did not have children aged ￿ve to ￿fteen (and therefore could not send), 74 households that had no
network quality measure (usually due to not having immediate family members), 54 households that did not engage in
agriculture during one of the three years, and 57 households where the household head did not complete an individual
questionnaire (only household rosters were completed).
171996; Locoh, 1997). Because the survey respondents are rural, subsistence farmers, their economic
environment and relevant crises are best captured by measures of their agricultural shocks. To
calculate a household agricultural shock measure, I use the response to the question, ￿For each
crop grown in a given year, how much of that crop was lost due to an unexpected agricultural
shock?￿To help respondents answer the question, the enumerators were trained to provide examples
of unexpected agricultural shocks such as animals running through the respondent￿ s ￿elds, pests,
rodents, or fungi destroying crops, or unexpected weather damage. The answers were coded from
zero (no loss) to three (a large loss). For the regressions, the household￿ s agricultural shock variable,
for each of the three years, is calculated as the average of the shocks for every crop grown by that
household in that year.23 The average household shock across all crops for the three years is 1.90.
The household demographics in the regression are measured using the number of boys and girls
aged zero to four, ￿ve to ten, and eleven to ￿fteen to allow for the possibility that demographic
imbalances in￿ uence the household fostering decision (Lloyd and Desai, 1992).24 Summary statistics
for the variables used in the regression are in Table 4. I ￿nd a household is more likely to send out
a child in a given year if it experiences a worse agricultural shock that year, has a better quality
network where it can send the child, and has more girls aged ￿ve to ￿fteen.
In Table 6, I present the marginal e⁄ects of an incremental change in the independent variables
on the probability a household sends a child in a given year. Regardless of the speci￿cation, a
household that experiences a worse agricultural shock in a given year is more likely to send out
a child, controlling for the household￿ s history of shocks. In the regression using the percentage
of good network members as the network quality measure and not controlling for wealth, a one
unit increase (roughly one standard deviation) in the shock measure increases the probability a
23Results are qualitatively similar and robust when I use two alternative measures of household shocks. I calculate
￿rst an agricultural shock measure restricted to only grains (millet, sorghum, maize, and rice) grown by that household
in a given year and then second restricted to the main staple crops, millet and sorghum.
24Alternatively, using the fraction of children in a given age and gender category yielded similar regression results.
18household sends a child by 3.2 percent (column 2), a marginal e⁄ect that is signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero at the 1 percent level. With eleven percent of households sending children, a one standard
deviation increase in a household￿ s agricultural shock leads to a 29.1 percent increase in fostering.
In these regressions, I control for the history of shocks a household faced at time t, t ￿ 1, and
t ￿ 2. The coe¢ cients on the one and two-period lagged shocks are negative and smaller but are
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.25 I also include village dummies to control for factors that
are unique to each village. Possible village heterogeneity includes varying local weather patterns
a⁄ecting agricultural shocks or access to di⁄erent types of network members due to diverse migration
patterns. Testing the joint signi￿cance of the village indicator variables yields a ￿2(14) test statistic
of 28.99, with a corresponding p-value of 0.01.
These results imply that shocks in￿ uence the household sending decision, and in regressions not
presented, I attempt to disentangle the two distinct types of shocks examined in the theoretical
model, those a⁄ecting consumption and those a⁄ecting marginal productivity. In the previous re-
gressions, children aged ￿ve to ￿fteen inclusive are considered eligible to be fostered, but there are
also younger foster children. Since these younger children are not involved in household produc-
tion, a ￿nding that shocks positively in￿ uence the sending decision for young children is evidence
supporting the consumption smoothing explanation and against the labor productivity story. I
estimate a logit regression with the dependent variable measuring household sending of children
aged zero to seven and the same independent variables as in column 2 of Table 6. The coe¢ cient on
household shocks is negative and statistically signi￿cant at the ten percent level. This is suggestive
evidence that households send older, but not younger, children for labor productivity reasons.26
However, the older child might simply consume more than the younger child, and therefore this
25Using the same observation sample, but controlling only for one-period lagged shocks or not controlling for any
lagged shocks, yields similar coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors on the current period household shock.
26However, the results are not robust to alternative age cuto⁄s. Regressions using a dependent variable measuring
children aged zero to six or zero to eight yield negative but insigni￿cant coe¢ cients for the household shock variable.
19result does not show conclusively that labor productivity is the only motivation for household
sending.
Table 6 also provides evidence that a household with a better quality network is more likely
to send out a child in a given year. Column 1 includes the ad hoc network quality measure and
column 2 uses the measure calculated as the percentage of members above the 80th percentile.
A household with a good ad hoc network quality measure is 4.4 percent more likely to send a
child in a given year, and the coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the ten percent level.
Increasing a household￿ s percentage of good network members by one percent implies the household
is 0.22 percent more likely to send a child in a given year, which is signi￿cant at the one percent
level. Compared to the base level of household sending, the magnitude of the network quality e⁄ect
is large. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of good members in a household￿ s
network leads to a 30 percent increase in fostering.
The demographic variables indicate that a household with more girls aged ￿ve to ￿fteen has a
higher probability of sending a child in a given year. In the column 2 speci￿cation, an additional
older girl increases the probability of sending a child by 3.8 percent (signi￿cant at the one percent
level), while an additional girl aged ￿ve to ten increases the sending probability by 1.9 percent
(signi￿cant at the ten percent level). Having additional boys or girls aged zero to four reduces
the probability of sending a child, which is consistent with the explanation that older children are
needed to care for their younger siblings, but the coe¢ cients are not statistically signi￿cant. The
results for the demographic variables are consistent with the literature that argues a household will
use fostering to cope with a redundancy of children in a particular age and gender category.
The last three columns of Table 6 present similar regressions but control for household wealth
using three di⁄erent measures. Results for shocks, network quality, and household demographics
are robust to the inclusion of these wealth measures. Household wealth in column 3 is measured
20as the value of the household￿ s livestock and assets.27 Column 4 uses a measure of the household￿ s
permanent income calculated as the three-year average of income earned from agricultural and
non-agricultural sources. Column 5 estimates a linear probability model using characteristics of
the respondent￿ s parents as instruments for household wealth.28 Results for the di⁄erent household
wealth measures indicate that permanent characteristics of the household are not important for the
sending decision. None of the coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant and all are close to zero.29
4.2 Household Receiving Decision
The theoretical framework implies that the same covariates in￿ uencing the household￿ s sending
decision should also in￿ uence the decision to receive a child, but I do not ￿nd empirical support
for this. I organize the receiving decision analysis in a similar way as the sending decision. I
begin by examining, for a household that received a child from a network member, why it selected
that particular member￿ s child. Analogous to Table 3, I estimate logit and household ￿xed e⁄ects
logit regressions estimating the probability a network member￿ s child is received based on the
network member￿ s characteristics and the joint characteristics of the match. Using these estimated
coe¢ cients, I calculate a comparable receiving household network quality, and I then estimate the
household decision to receive a child in a given year as a function of household shocks, receiver￿ s
network quality, and demographics. None of these variables is statistically signi￿cant, but in a
similar regression that controls for household wealth, I ￿nd that richer households are signi￿cantly
more likely to receive a child.
27Assets include seventeen di⁄erent items that rural households might typically own, such as a bicycle, a radio, a
wheelbarrow, and a cart. To account for heterogeneity in asset quality across individuals, the value of each asset as
reported by the respondent is used to measure total asset value.
28The instruments include the number of wives of the respondent￿ s father, the rank of the respondent￿ s mother
among the father￿ s wives, the number of children of the respondent￿ s father, the number of children of the respondent￿ s
mother, and village level positions held by either the father or mother.
29Regression results including an interaction of household wealth and shocks, to measure the di⁄erential impact of
negative shocks on rich and poor households, were inconclusive. Similarly, results were statistically insigni￿cant for
regressions including an interaction of network quality and shocks.
21Table 7 presents logit and household ￿xed e⁄ects logit regressions estimating the probability
a network member￿ s child is received. For this analysis, I restrict the data to households that
received children from immediate family network members between 1998 and 2000. Each of the
1771 observations in the restricted dataset consist of an immediate family member￿ s child (aged ￿ve
to ￿fteen) linked with a receiving household. This restriction is necessary because I use information
about network members whose children potentially could have been received but were not.
The results show that none of the occupation variables is statistically signi￿cant. This is con-
sistent with the Table 6 ￿nding that sender￿ s wealth, which is highly correlated with occupation, is
not an important determinant of the sending decision. A respondent￿ s adult child is 10.6 percent
more likely to send a child compared to the respondent￿ s brother, and recently married network
members are 12.2 percent more likely to send a child. The marital status results are consistent with
Table 3 results, in which network members with these characteristics were less likely to receive a
child. Network members who attended school are less likely to send a child, but the coe¢ cient is
not signi￿cant. However, network members with children in school are signi￿cantly less likely to
send a child. Consistent with Table 6, these results provide additional evidence that demographics
in￿ uence the sending decision, with girls aged eleven to ￿fteen 4.2 percent more likely to be sent.
I use the coe¢ cients from the ￿xed e⁄ects logit regression to calculate an analogous receiving
network quality measure. I link every household in the sample, even if it did not receive a child, with
each network member￿ s child aged ￿ve to ￿fteen to calculate the predicted value that a network
member￿ s child would be received by the sample household, if the child were sent. Using these
predicted values, the receiving network quality measure is calculated as the percentage of network
members￿children who have a predicted value of being selected that lies above the 80th percentile.
In Table 8, I present the marginal e⁄ects from a logit regression estimating the probability a
household receives a child in a given year as a function of its agricultural shocks, network quality,
22and household demographics. For this analysis, I use the same 358-observation sample used in the
sending regressions, but I drop observations from four villages that have no receiving households.30
The dependent variable, household receiving, takes the value one if household i in village v received
a child aged ￿ve to ￿fteen (inclusive) during year t and zero otherwise. Its mean is 0.08 with a
standard deviation of 0.28. Results in column 1 indicate that households experiencing worse shocks
are less likely to receive a child in a given year, but the coe¢ cient is small and not statistically
signi￿cant. The network quality coe¢ cient is close to zero and not signi￿cant. Likewise, the
demographic variables are not signi￿cant and exhibit no clear pattern. Column 2 estimates a similar
regression controlling for household wealth. A one standard deviation increase in the household￿ s
wealth increases the probability of receiving a child by 2.9 percent, and is signi￿cant at the ￿ve
percent level. Similar to column 1, none of the other coe¢ cients is signi￿cant.
4.3 Jointly Testing Sending and Receiving Decisions
The sending regressions in Table 6 and the receiving regressions in Table 8 provide evidence that
the same covariates do not in￿ uence both decisions. However, those regressions are not mirror
images of each other due to the presence of non-fostering households in the sample. In the sending
regression, senders are compared to the group of non-fostering and receiving households, while in the
receiving regression, receivers are compared to the group of non-fostering and sending households.
To test the theoretical implication that the factors in￿ uencing the sending decision in￿ uence the
receiving decision in an equal and opposite way, I use a multinomial logit regression to estimate
the probability a household sends a child, receives a child, or does neither in a given year. This
allows for a comparison of senders against non-fostering households and receivers against non-
fostering households. The dependent variable takes the value no fostering in 80.6 percent of the
30In Appendix Table 2, I re-estimate the sending regression using the smaller 273-observation receiving sample,
and results are similar but standard errors are larger.
23observations, sending in 11.7 percent, and receiving in 7.7 percent. To maintain consistency with
the earlier regressions, I use the 273-observation sample (drawn from the 358-observation sample
used in the sending regressions, but dropping observations from four villages that have no receiving
households).
Column 1 of Table 9 shows the sending outcome results to be similar to the Table 6 sending
regressions, except for slightly larger standard errors due to the smaller sample size. A one standard
deviation increase in a household￿ s shock increases the probability of sending a child by 3.6 percent.
The results for network quality and number of girls aged ￿ve to ￿fteen indicate a similar impact on
the sending decision as previously seen, with the coe¢ cients similar in magnitude and signi￿cance.
Column 2 presents the receiving outcome results, which are comparable to those in Table 8. None
of the coe¢ cients is statistically signi￿cant, except for the number of older girls.
The multinomial logit results indicate that sending households di⁄er from non-fostering house-
holds, but receiving households, at least by these measures, do not di⁄er from non-fostering house-
holds. To formally test this implication, I calculate a likelihood ratio test of the joint restriction
that the coe¢ cients for shocks, network quality, and demographics for the sending outcome are
equal and opposite to the coe¢ cients for the receiving outcome. This yields a ￿2(10) test statistic
of 23.93 with a corresponding p-value of 0.008. Based on these results, I reject the symmetric,
theoretical model for child fostering.
5 Conclusion
Although previous research often assumes that household structure is exogenous, the results of
this paper provide strong evidence against the validity of that assumption. This paper analyzes
a household￿ s decision to adjust its composition by sending and receiving children and ￿nds that
24a household is signi￿cantly more likely to send out a child if it experiences a negative income
shock, has a better quality social network, or has additional children in a given age and gender
class. Quantifying the magnitude of this impact shows that increases of one standard deviation in
a household￿ s agricultural shock, percentage of good members in its network, or number of older
girls would increase the probability of sending a child above the current level of fostering by 29.1,
30.0, and 34.5 percent, respectively.
The research methodology that involved locating the sending and receiving households par-
ticipating in each fostering exchange makes these data well-suited for examining explanations for
changes in household structure that previous researchers could not. In particular, this is the ￿rst
paper to provide empirical evidence that households use child fostering as a risk-coping mechanism
in response to adverse shocks and income ￿ uctuations. It is also the ￿rst paper to analyze and
quantitatively measure the importance of social networks for the child fostering decision. Future
research should take advantage of these data to extend this analysis by measuring the impact of
social networks on children￿ s educational and welfare outcomes. In addition, to further understand
the endogeneity of household structure, future research should examine the factors in￿ uencing the
timing of new household formation.
Understanding why households engage in this social institution has signi￿cant policy implica-
tions for international development organizations who are currently trying to prevent children from
growing up away from their biological parents. However, related research using these data indicates
foster children are not negatively a⁄ected (in terms of school enrollment) in either the short-run
or long-run by living away from their biological parents (Akresh, 2004). If child fostering insulates
households from adverse shocks, provides them access to the bene￿ts of extended family networks,
and moves children to households where they are more productive, then restricting the movement
of children as a policy prescription should be reevaluated. The prevalence of child fostering as a
25means for a household to adjust its structure suggests it is also critical for governments and de-
velopment organizations, in designing and evaluating policies, to allow for the possibility that a
household changes its size in response to programs (Edmonds, Mammen, Miller, 2005).
These results about why a household adjusts its structure also have implications for the larger
issue in Africa and even the United States of how to de￿ne a household and who should be considered
as actors who potentially in￿ uence a child￿ s welfare outcomes. Children living away from their
biological parents is not a phenomenon restricted to Africa. Using the 1910 United States census,
Moehling (2002) found evidence that 3 percent of white mothers and 12 percent of African-American
mothers under age 35 had children not living with them. More recent evidence from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a representative sample of children aged 14 to 21 as of 1979, shows
that 2.6 percent of non-orphaned white children and 5.2 percent of non-orphaned black children
under age 15 were not living with either biological parent (Haurin, 1992). Whenever household
size and composition are choices, researchers need to consider the potential biases arising from
endogenous household structure.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics from Burkina Faso Household Survey 
 
   
Percentage of Households Involved in Fostering a Child During 1998, 1999, or 2000  27% 
  Percentage of Households Sending   16% 
  Percentage of Households Receiving   14% 
 Percentage  of  Households Sending and Receiving   3% 
    
Percentage of Children (Aged 5 to 15) Living Away From Biological Parents  10% 
   
Mean Duration Spent Away From Parents (in years)  2.75 
   
Location of Where Foster Children Were Sent or Received   
  Percentage Within 25 Mile Radius of Parents  60% 
  Percentage in Capital City, Ouagadougou (50 miles away)  25% 
  Percentage in Other Provinces of Burkina Faso (150 miles away)  6% 
  Percentage in Côte d’Ivoire (800 miles away)  9% 
   
Mean Characteristics of Household Composition   
  Number of Members per Household  10.6 
  Number of Wives per Household  1.5 
  Number of Children Under Age 18 per Household  3.6 
  Number of Children Above Age 18 per Household  3.2 
 Number  of  Additional  Other Members per Household  1.3 
    
Mean Number of Immediate Family Network Members per Household  13 
    
Mean Household Income  $183 
   
 
Note: Data source: Author’s survey.    31
Table 2:  Tabulation of Whether Immediate Family Member Received a Foster Child,  
Broken Down by Relationship of Immediate Family Member with Sending Family (Panel A) and 
Occupation (Panel B) 
[Column Percent] 
 
Panel A: Relationship     
  Did Not Receive Foster Child  Received Foster Child 
Parents 8.6%  31.9% 
    
Brother 39.1%  26.9% 
    
Sister 40.5%  20.0% 
    
Adult Non-coresident Children  11.8%  21.2% 
    
Number of Immediate Family 
Members 
2204 160 
    
    
Panel B: Occupation     
  Did Not Receive Foster Child  Received Foster Child 
Farmer 72.6%  69.4% 
    
Employee, bureaucrat  3.5%  5.0% 
    
Business person  8.1%  12.5% 
    
Manual labor  1.8%  2.5% 
    
Housewife 6.6%  4.4% 
    
Other job  3.5%  5.0% 
    
Unemployed or retired  3.9%  1.2% 
    




Note: In Panel A, for those immediate family members who did not receive a foster child, column 1 
presents the percentage of these members broken down by their relationship to the sending family.  
Column 2 presents the percentage of members broken down by relationship, for those members that did 
receive a foster child. Testing for the equality of the columns yields a LR χ
2(3) test statistic equal to 87.7 
with the corresponding p-value equal to 0.  In Panel B, for those immediate family members who did not 
receive a foster child, column 1 presents the percentage of these members in each occupation.  Column 2 
presents the percentage of members by occupation for those members that did receive a foster child. 
Testing for the equality of the columns yields a LR χ
2(6) test statistic equal to 10.2 with the corresponding 
p-value equal to 0.12.  Data source: Author’s survey. 
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Table 3:  Marginal Effects for Logit and Household Fixed Effect Logit Regressions Estimating 
the Probability of Selecting a Given Network Member to Receive a Foster Child 
Dependent Variable: Network member is selected  (1)  (2) 
  Logit  HH Fixed Effect Logit 
Network Member’s Occupation     
 Employee,  bureaucrat  0.032**  0.034 
 [0.016]  [0.029] 
 Business  person  0.045***  0.068*** 
 [0.013]  [0.019] 
 Manual  labor  0.033*  0.049 
 [0.019]  [0.040] 
 Housewife  -0.009  -0.031 
 [0.016]  [0.031] 
 Other  job  0.047***  0.072** 
 [0.016]  [0.029] 
  Unemployed or retired  -0.063*  -0.089* 
 [0.033]  [0.049] 
Relationship to Network Member     
 Parents  0.091***  0.129*** 
 [0.012]  [0.019] 
 Sisters  -0.017  -0.025 
 [0.012]  [0.017] 
  Adult Non-coresident Children  0.050***  0.081*** 
 [0.010]  [0.018] 
Network Member’s Marital Status     
 Recently  married  -0.028*  -0.042* 
 [0.015]  [0.024] 
 Widowed/Divorced  -0.053***  -0.082*** 
 [0.015]  [0.022] 
 Never  Married  -0.070***  -0.101*** 
 [0.019]  [0.029] 
Network Member’s Education     
 Attended  school  0.001  0.017 
 [0.014]  [0.023] 
  Has children in school  -0.007  -0.020 
 [0.011]  [0.018] 
Network Member’s Household Demographics     
  Network Member Has Boys 0-5  -0.027***  -0.042** 
 [0.010]  [0.017] 
  Network Member Has Boys 6-10  -0.012  -0.018 
 [0.009]  [0.015] 
  Network Member Has Boys 11-15  0.017*  0.027* 
 [0.010]  [0.016] 
  Network Member Has Girls 0-5  -0.001  -0.005 
 [0.011]  [0.016] 
  Network Member Has Girls 6-10  -0.005  -0.009 
 [0.010]  [0.015] 
  Network Member Has Girls 11-15  0.008  0.009 
 [0.012]  [0.017]   33
Table 3 (Continued):  Regressions Estimating the Probability of Selecting a Given Network 
Member to Receive a Foster Child 
 
Dependent Variable: Network member is selected  (1)  (2) 
  Logit  HH Fixed Effect Logit 
Characteristics of Child Sent     
  Boy Sent aged 5-10  -0.006  0.026 
 [0.006]  [0.030] 
  Girl Sent aged 11-15  -0.013*  0.003 
 [0.007]  [0.033] 
  Boy Sent aged 11-15  -0.012**  -0.003 
 [0.006]  [0.039] 
Network Member’s Household Demographics     
  Birth in 2000  -0.008  -0.007 
 [0.012]  [0.020] 
  Birth in 1999  -0.010  -0.003 
 [0.015]  [0.021] 
  Birth in 1998  0.001  0.010 
 [0.013]  [0.021] 
    
Number of Observations  2364  2364 
Log-Likelihood Value:  -509.08  -357.52 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The omitted categories for the dummy variables included in the regression are: occupation variable is 
farmer, relationship to respondent variable is brother, marital status variable is married longer than 4 
years, and child sent variable is girl aged 5 to 10.  Data source: Author's survey.  34
Table 4:  Means and Standard Deviations for Household Level Characteristics 
 
 
Variables  Mean Standard Deviation
 
Proportion of Households Sending Children  0.11 0.32
 
Percentage of good network members  22.84 14.98
Proportion of households with good ad hoc network quality 
measure  0.54 0.50
Number of network members  13.39 7.89
 
Household shock t  1.90 0.96
Household shock t-1  1.23 1.01
Household shock t-2  1.15 1.07
 
Household Wealth (in 100,000 FCFA)  4.19 7.34
Household Permanent Income (in 100,000 FCFA)  1.29 1.65
 
Number of Boys Aged 0 to 4  0.58 0.74
Number of Boys Aged 5 to 10  0.89 0.90
Number of Boys Aged 11 to 15  0.78 0.95
 
Number of Girls Aged 0 to 4  0.65 0.73
Number of Girls Aged 5 to 10  0.99 1.06
Number of Girls Aged 11 to 15  0.68 0.84
 
Number of observations  358
 
Note: Ad hoc network quality measure is considered good if the household has network members who 
are business people and network members who are either parents or adult children. The percentage of 
good network members is calculated as the percentage of the household’s network members with a 
predicted value of being selected to receive a foster child that lies above the 80
th percentile (additional 
details on both network quality measures are in the paper). Household shocks are calculated as the 
average of the shock measures, which range from zero (no loss) to three (large loss), for every crop 
grown by that household in that year. Household wealth and permanent income are measured in units of 
100,000 FCFA, with the average exchange rate between 1998 and 2000, $1 USD = 641 FCFA. 
Household wealth is measured as the value of the household’s livestock and assets in a given year. 
Permanent income is measured as the three-year average of household income earned from agricultural 
and non-agricultural sources. Data source: Author’s survey. 
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Table 5:  Tabulation of Whether Household Sent a Child, Broken Down by Household’s 
Network Quality (Column Percent) 
 
 
Network Quality  Did Not Send a Child  Sent a Child 
    
Household with percentage of good 
members below median value  56.6%  35.0% 
    
Household with percentage of good 
members above median value  43.4%  65.0% 
    
 






Note: For those households that did not send a child in a given year, column 1 records the percentage of 
those households that had above or below the median network quality of 20.0 percent.  Column 2 presents 
the same percentage for those households that did send a child. Testing for the equality of the columns 
yields a LR χ
2(1) test statistic equal to 6.7 with the corresponding p-value equal to 0.01. Data source: 
Author’s survey.   36
Table 6:  Marginal Effects from Household Level Logit and Linear Probability Model 
Regressions Estimating the Probability of Sending a Child in a Given Year 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Household Sends a Child 
 




  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
        
Household  shock  t  0.031** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.040* 
 [0.013]  [0.012]  [0.013] [0.012] [0.024] 
Household  shock  t-1  -0.000  -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.014] [0.014] [0.021] 
Household  shock  t-2  -0.016  -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.025 
 [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.013] [0.013] [0.021] 
        








Ad hoc network quality  
 (Parents/Adult Kids * Businessman) 
0.044* 
[0.025] 
    
        
Number  of  Boys  0-4  -0.014  -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 
 [0.015]  [0.013]  [0.013] [0.013] [0.021] 
Number  of  Boys  5-10  0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
 [0.013]  [0.012]  [0.012] [0.013] [0.026] 
Number  of  Boys  11-15  0.023  0.021 0.021 0.021 0.035 
 [0.015]  [0.014]  [0.014] [0.014] [0.023] 
        
Number  of  Girls  0-4  -0.021  -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 
 [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.018] [0.017] [0.026] 
Number  of  Girls  5-10  0.015 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.034* 
 [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.010] [0.010] [0.019] 
Number  of  Girls  11-15  0.041***  0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.068** 
 [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012] [0.012] [0.027] 
        
Household  wealth     -0.00001    
     [0.001]    
Household permanent income        0.002   
      [0.008]   
Predicted household wealth (parents’ 
 characteristics as instruments) 
     -0.006 
[0.013] 
Number  of  observations  358  358 358 358 341
a 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
regressions also include village dummies. In column 5, household wealth is instrumented using the following 
characteristics of the respondent’s parents: number of wives of respondent’s father, rank of respondent’s 
mother among father’s wives, number of children of respondent’s father, number of children of respondent’s 
mother, and village level positions held by either the father or mother.  Data source: Author's survey. 
a Column 5 uses only 341 observations because of missing values in the instruments.  Replication of the 
regressions in the other columns using the 341-observation sample yields similar results.   37
Table 7: Marginal Effects for Logit and Household Fixed Effect Logit Regressions Estimating 
the Probability a Network Member’s Child Is Received 
 
Dependent Variable:   (1)  (2) 
Network member’s child is received  Logit   HH Fixed Effect Logit 
Network Member’s Occupation     
 Employee,  bureaucrat  -0.021  -0.036 
 [0.037]  [0.053] 
 Business  person  -0.015  -0.060 
 [0.020]  [0.037] 
 Manual  labor  -0.003  -0.006 
 [0.053]  [0.068] 
 Housewife  0.004  -0.025 
 [0.023]  [0.041] 
 Other  job  0.003  -0.014 
 [0.033]  [0.046] 
  Unemployed or retired  -0.039  -0.029 
 [0.044]  [0.071] 
Relationship to Network Member    
 Parents  0.033***  0.035 
 [0.012]  [0.028] 
 Sisters  -0.014  -0.032 
 [0.015]  [0.020] 
  Adult Non-coresident Children  0.049***  0.106*** 
 [0.011]  [0.025] 
Network Member’s Marital Status      
 Recently  married  0.088***  0.122** 
 [0.034]  [0.053] 
 Widowed/Divorced  0.031  0.042 
 [0.020]  [0.030] 
Network Member’s Education    
  Network Member Attended School  -0.018  -0.054 
 [0.026]  [0.051] 
  Network Member Has Kids in School  -0.028***  -0.041** 
 [0.010]  [0.018] 
Characteristics of Child Sent     
  Boy sent aged 5-10  -0.036***  -0.044** 
 [0.012]  [0.017] 
  Girl sent aged 11-15  0.024**  0.042** 
 [0.011]  [0.017] 
  Boy sent aged 11-15  -0.016  -0.014 
 [0.015]  [0.020] 
Network Member’s Household Demographics     
  Birth in 2000  0.006  0.010 
 [0.010]  [0.018] 
  Birth in 1999  -0.006  -0.013 
 [0.012]  [0.021] 
  Birth in 1998  0.001  0.003 
 [0.011]  [0.021]   38
Table 7 (Continued): Regressions Estimating the Probability a Network Member’s  
Child Is Received 
 
Dependent Variable:   (1) (2) 
Network member’s child is received  Logit   HH Fixed Effect Logit 
Receiving Household Demographics    
  Receiving Household has Boys 0-4  0.002  -0.009 
 [0.009]  [0.069] 
  Receiving Household has Boys 5-10  0.010  -0.103 
 [0.008]  [0.114] 
  Receiving Household has Boys 11-15  -0.012*  0.078 
 [0.007]  [0.089] 
  Receiving Household has Girls 0-4  0.001  0.001 
 [0.007]  [0.072] 
  Receiving Household has Girls 5-10  -0.020**  0.051 
 [0.008]  [0.105] 
  Receiving Household has Girls 11-15  -0.016*  -0.119* 
 [0.009]  [0.072] 
    
Number of Observations  1771 1771 
Log-Likelihood Value:  -387.77 -266.63 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The omitted categories for the dummy variables included in the regression are: occupation variable is farmer, 
relationship to respondent variable is brother, marital status variable is married longer than 4 years, and child 
sent variable is girl aged 5 to 10. Data source: Author's survey. 
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Table 8: Marginal Effects from Household Level Logit Regressions Estimating the Probability of 
Receiving a Child in a Given Year 
 
    
Dependent Variable: Household Receives a Child  (1)  (2) 
    
Household shock t  -0.004  0.003 
 [0.016]  [0.016] 
    
Household shock t-1  -0.018  -0.016 
 [0.021]  [0.020] 
    
Household shock t-2  0.006  0.007 
 [0.018]  [0.017] 
    
Receiver network quality (Percentage of good 





    
Household wealth    0.004** 
   [0.002] 
    
Number of Boys 0-4  -0.006  -0.010 
 [0.022]  [0.022] 
    
Number of Boys 5-10  -0.011  -0.015 
 [0.016]  [0.015] 
    
Number of Boys 11-15  0.015  0.013 
 [0.017]  [0.017] 
    
Number of Girls 0-4  -0.034  -0.033 
 [0.021]  [0.021] 
    
Number of Girls 5-10  -0.002  -0.004 
 [0.016]  [0.013] 
    
Number of Girls 11-15  0.025  0.019 
 [0.015]  [0.015] 
    
Number of Observations  273  273 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Regressions also include village dummies. Sample used in the receiving analysis is the same 358-
observation sample as for the sending regression, but 4 villages are dropped due to no receiving 
households in those villages. Results in the sending regression are similar when using the smaller 273-
observation sample (see Appendix 2). The mean of the dependent variable, household receiving, is 0.08, 
with a standard deviation of 0.28. Data source: Author’s survey.   40
Table 9: Marginal Effects from Household Level Multinomial Logit Regression Estimating the 
Probability of Sending, Receiving, or No Fostering 
 
 (1)  (2) 
Dependent Variable: Send, Receive, No Foster  Sending  Receiving 
    
Household shock t  0.036**  -0.001 
 [0.016]  [0.002] 
    
Household shock t-1  -0.006  -0.002 
 [0.019]  [0.003] 
    
Household shock t-2  -0.018  0.001 
 [0.018]  [0.003] 
    
Sender Network Quality (Percentage of good 





    
Number of Boys 0-4  -0.021  -0.000 
 [0.018]  [0.003] 
    
Number of Boys 5-10  0.009  -0.002 
 [0.014]  [0.002] 
    
Number of Boys 11-15  0.012  0.002 
 [0.017]  [0.002] 
    
Number of Girls 0-4  -0.033  -0.004 
 [0.023]  [0.003] 
    
Number of Girls 5-10  0.029**  -0.000 
 [0.013]  [0.002] 
    
Number of Girls 11-15  0.050***  0.004* 
 [0.018]  [0.0024] 
    
Number of Observations  273  273 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Regression also includes village dummies. The likelihood ratio test of the joint restriction that the 
coefficients for the sending regression are equal and opposite to the coefficients for the receiving 
regression yields a χ
2(10) test statistic of 23.93 with a corresponding p-value of 0.008. Data source: 
Author’s survey.   41
Appendix Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Network Members’ Characteristics 
 
Variables Mean  Standard  Deviation
Dependent Variable: Network Member is Selected  0.068  0.251 
Network Member’s Occupation     
 Employee,  bureaucrat  0.036  0.187 
 Business  person  0.084  0.277 
 Manual  labor  0.018  0.134 
 Housewife  0.064  0.245 
 Other  job  0.036  0.187 
  Unemployed or retired  0.037  0.189 
    
Relationship to Network Member     
 Parents  0.102  0.302 
 Sisters  0.391  0.488 
 Adult  Kids  0.124  0.330 
    
Network Member’s Marital Status     
 Recently  Married  0.093  0.291 
 Widowed/Divorced  0.110  0.313 
 Never  Married  0.092  0.289 
    
Network Member’s Education     
 Attended  school  0.076  0.265 
  Network Member Has Kids in School  0.158  0.365 
    
Network Member’s Household Demographics     
  Network Member Has Boys 0-5  0.362  0.481 
  Network Member Has Boys 6-10  0.313  0.464 
  Network Member Has Boys 11-15  0.164  0.370 
  Network Member Has Girls 0-5  0.304  0.460 
  Network Member Has Girls 6-10  0.266  0.442 
  Network Member Has Girls 11-15  0.122  0.327 
  Birth in 2000  0.209  0.406 
  Birth in 1999  0.131  0.337 
  Birth in 1998  0.142  0.349 
    
Characteristics of Child Sent     
  Boy Sent aged 5-10  0.187  0.390 
  Girl Sent aged 11-15  0.298  0.457 
  Boy Sent aged 11-15  0.126  0.332 
Number of Observations  2364   
 
Note: Each variable is a 0, 1 indicator recording whether the network member possessed that 
characteristic.  Means indicate percentage of network members that possess that characteristic. Data 
source: Author’s survey.   42
Appendix Table 2: Marginal Effects from Household Level Logit Regression Estimating the 
Probability of Sending a Child in a Given Year Using Restricted 273-Observation Sample 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  Household Sends a Child  (1) 
  
Household shock t  0.038** 
 [0.016] 
  
Household shock t-1  -0.004 
 [0.018] 
  
Household shock t-2  -0.022 
 [0.017] 
  
Percentage of good network members in household’s network  0.0019** 
 [0.0009] 
  
Number of Boys 0-4  -0.021 
 [0.017] 
  
Number of Boys 5-10  0.012 
 [0.013] 
  
Number of Boys 11-15  0.009 
 [0.016] 
  
Number of Girls 0-4  -0.035 
 [0.022] 
  
Number of Girls 5-10  0.026** 
 [0.013] 
  
Number of Girls 11-15  0.047*** 
 [0.016] 
  
Number of Observations  273 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Regression also includes village dummies. Sample used in this analysis is the restricted 273-observation 
sample that corresponds to the 358-observation sending regression sample (in Table 6) dropping the 4 
villages with no receiving households. Data source: Author's survey. 